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NOTES AND COMMENT
sion of the interest of the beneficiaries. However, in Fontheim v.
Third Avenue Railway,3 7 it was held that "The foundation of every
[death] action of this kind is in the injury which caused the death,
and not merely in the fact of death itself, and if an injured person
recovers a judgment for that injury during his lifetime or compromises
his claims and accepts satisfaction for his injury, his representatives
cannot maintain any action upon his subsequent death resulting there-
from." On closer study of the statute, this decision appears sound.
The enactment does not relate specifically to personal injury actions,
but is designed to prevent the abatement of such actions, and applies
only to those continued or brought after the death of the injured per-
son. A recovery by one who was permanently disabled for life as a
result of a wrongful act, would include damages for the loss of earnings
for the probable duration of his working days. These damages would
supposedly compensate him for the injury, and enable him to continue
to support his family and pay his debts. "In this situation, it is
obvious that a recovery under the wrongful death statute, assuming
the injury causes premature death, would result in a duplication of
damages. Here, one right of action affords complete relief." 88
BERNARD SCHIFF.
LIABILITY OF DEPARTMiENT STORES FOR TORTS OF LESSEES
Theory of Action
It is a fundamental rule in the law of agency, that a principal is
liable for the acts of his agent 1 done within the scope of his employ-
37 257 App. Div. 147, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 90 (1st Dept. 1939), app. granted,
257 App. Div. 948, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 281 (1st Dept. 1939), app. denied, 281 N. Y.
392, 24 N. E. (2d) 95 (1940).
38 N. Y. LAw REvisION CommissIoN, Leg. Doc. (1935) No. 60 (E) p. 55.
'Hoffman v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 92 U. S. 161 (1875);
Vicksburg & M. R. R. v. O'Brien, 119 U. S. 99, 7 Sup. Ct. 118 (1886) ; Ameri-
can Bonding and Trust Co. v. Takahashi, 111 Fed. 125 (C. C. A. 9th, 1901) ;
Mather v. Barnes, 146 Fed. 1000 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906); Armour v. Michigan
C. R. R., 65 N. Y. 111 (1875); Isham v. Post, 141 N. Y. 100, 35 N. E. 1084
(1894) ; MECHEM, AGENCY § 704; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 140.
The common law maxims respondeat superior and qui facit per alium,
facit per se form the basis for the principal's liability. The thought is that
every man owes a duty to use care in conducting his affairs. Violation of this
duty by his agent to the subsequent injury of a third party, should make the
principal liable, since he has the privilege of selecting his alter ego.
1940 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ment2  This liability may be ex contractu 3 or ex delicto.4  In cases
involving a department store, lessee, and injured third party, the
plaintiff predicates his cause of action upon this theory, endeavoring to
hold the department store accountable for the wrong of the lessee. It
becomes necessary, therefore, that an agency relationship between the
department store and lessee be established. Where the department
store has delegated actual authority, either express or implied, to the
lessee, the proof of agency is comparatively simple. The cases which
present the difficulty are those in which the facts show that the lessee
operated as an independent contractor.5  It is here that the question
of apparent agency assumes importance.
Apparent Agency
Apparent agency, 6 strictly speaking, is no agency at all, but is
2 "For the lack of a better term it is said in order to charge the master with
the servant's negligence, the servant must be acting 'in the course of his under-
taking' or within the 'course of his employment.' This term 'course of his
employment,' like the corresponding term 'the scope of the authority' in cases'of
agency, and 'the scope of the business' in cases of partnership, is one not capable
of precise definition although many attempts have been made to define it. It is
largely a question of fact and its determination may vary in each case in view of
the peculiar circumstances. The utmost that can ordinarily be said is that a
servant is acting within the course of his employment when he is engaged in
doing for his master, either the act consciously and specifically directed or any
act which can fairly and reasonably be deemed to be an ordinary and natural
incident or attribute of that act or a natural, direct and logical result of it. If
in doing such an act, the servant acts negligently, that is negligence within the
course of the employment." 2 C. J. (1915) § 536, n.39(b), p. 853.
3 Westfield Bank v. Cornen, 37 N. Y. 320 (1867); Schley v. Fryer, 100
N. Y. 71, 2 N. E. 280 (1885) ; Phillips v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 140 N. Y. 556,
35 N. E. 982 (1894) ; MECHEm, AGENCY §§ 704, 705; 2 Am. JuR. 353; RESTATE-
MENT, AGENCY § 144.
4 Bradford v. Hanover F. Ins. Co., 102 Fed. 48 (C. C. A. 3d, 1900) ; Jack-
son v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 139 N. C. 347, 51 S. E. 1015
(1905).
"If he employs incompetent or untrustworthy agents, it is his fault; and
whether the injury to third persons is caused by the negative or positive mis-
feasance of the agent, the maxim respondeat superior applies, provided only,
that the agent was acting at the time for the principal and within the scope of
the business intrusted to him." Higgins v. Watervliet Turnpike & R. R., 46
N. Y. 23, 27 (1871) ; Nowack v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 166 N. Y. 433, 60 N. E.
32 (18565).
52 Am. Jua. (1936) 88, §8. "An independent contractor may be distin-
guished from an agent in that he is a person who contracts with another to do
something for him, but who is not controlled or subject to the control of the
other in the performance of such contract but only as to the result. A principal,
on the other hand, has the right to control the conduct of an agent with respect
to matters intrusted to him. The theory which in many cases is adopted is to
differentiate between an agent and an independent contractor according to
whether he is subject to, or free from, the control of the employer with respect
to the details of the work." Note (1922) 19 A. L. R. 226.
6 Bank of Batavia v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R., 106 N. Y. 195, 199, 12 N. E.
433 (1889). The court stated, "It is a settled doctrine of the law of agency in
this state that where the principal has clothed his agent with power to do an act
upon the existence of some extrinsic fact necessarily and peculiarly within the
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based entirely upon estoppel. It exists where one induces another,
either intentionally or through negligence, to believe that a third per-
son is his agent.7 "The rule * * * embraces three ]frimary elements.
These are: (1) A representation by the principal; (2) a reliance upon
such representation by a third person; and (3) a change of position by
such third person in reliance upon such representation. All these
elements must be present to bring a case within the rule." 8 Barton
v. Studebaker Corp.9 affords an excellent illustration of this point.
There, the defendant automobile company was held not liable for the
injuries of the plaintiff which occurred while riding with an alleged
salesman. The corporation was allowed to prove that the salesman
was an independent contractor because a vital element of estoppel was
missing, namely, reliance on the representation of the defendant.' ° It
was not shown "that she (plaintiff) was influenced in the least degree
to ride with Owen (the salesman) because she believed that he was
the servant of the corporation. It is undoubtedly true that she never
gave any thought whatever to the nature of the business relation exist-
ing between Owen and the corporation:"'
The theory of ostensible agency is a just one. It proceeds upon
the doctrine that where one of two innocent parties must suffer from
the wrongful act of another, the loss should fall upon the one who
made it possible for the third party to perpetrate the wrong.12 There-
fore, it would seem to follow, that an apparent agency would have the
same legal effect as an actual agency.
knowledge of the agent, and of the existence of which the act of executing the
power is itself a representation, a third person dealing with such agent in entire
good faith pursuant to the apparent power, may rely upon the representation, and
the principal is estopped from denying its truth to his prejudice." 2 Am. JuR.(1936) § 101; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 8. For the technical difference between
apparent agency and estoppel, 1 Wn.LIsToN, CONTAcTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 277;
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §§ 8, 31 and 159.
The methods of creating an apparent agency were enumerated in Hackett
v. Van Frank, 105 Mo. App. 384, 79 S. W. 1013 (1904).
8 Fradley v. Hyland, 37 Fed. 49 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1888); Gosliner v.
Grangers' Bank, 124 Cal. 225, 56 Pac. 1029 (1889) ; Luft v. Arakelian, 33 Cal.
App. 463, 165 Pac. 712 (1917); Young v. Inman and Nelson, 146 Iowa 492,
125 N. W. 177 (1910) ; Essex County Acceptance Corp. v. Pierce-Arrow Sales
Co., 288 Mass. 270, 192 N. E. 604 (1934); Stanton v. Hawley, 193 App. Div.
559, 184 N. Y. Supp. 415 (3d Dept. 1920) ; Note (1935) 95 A. L. R. 1319.
9 46 Cal. App. 707, 189 Pac. 1025 (1920).
102 C. J. (1915) § 73. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 267, comment a, reads
as follows: "The mere fact that acts are done by one whom the injured party
believes to be the defendant's servant is not sufficient to cause the apparent
master to be liable. There must be such reliance upon the manifestation as
exposes the plaintiff to the negligent conduct. The rule normally applies where
the plaintiff has submitted himself to the care or protection of an apparent
servant in response to an apparent invitation from the defendant to enter into
such relations with such servant. A manifestation of authority constitutes an
invitation to deal with such servant and to enter into relations with him which
are consistent with the apparent authority."
1146 Cal. App. 707, 189 Pac. 1025, 1031 (1920).
122 Am. Jua. (1936) § 104.
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Liability in Tort
It was not until the case of Hannon v. Siegel-Cooper Co. Is that
a department store's liability for the wrong of its ostensible agent was
extended to the realm of tort. Previously it was felt that apparent
agency could only create a liability in contract.' 4  In that case, the
defendant store represented itself, through extensive advertising, as
carrying on the practice of dentistry. Plaintiff relied on the represen-
tation and secured treatment which was administered in a negligent
and unskillful fashion. In a suit to recover damages for injuries sus-
tained, it was held that the defendant was estopped from denying its
liability for the conduct of one whom it held out as agent, despite the
fact that the lessee-dentist was in reality an independent contractor.
The court said: 15
"But whenever the tort consists of a violation of duty which
springs from the contract between the parties, the ostensible
principal should be liable to the same extent in an action ex
delicto as in one ex contractu. * * * If A contracts with the
ostensible agent of B for the purchase of goods, he relies not
only on the business reputation of B, as to the goods he manu-
factures or sells, but on the pecuniary responsibility of B to
answer for any default in carrying out the contract. So here
the plaintiff had a right to rely not only on the presumption that
the defendant would employ a skillful dentist as its servant, but
also on the fact that if that servant, whether skillful or not,
was guilty of any malpractice, she had a responsible party to
answer therefor in damages."
This theory of tort liability has been followed to the present day and
Hannon v. Siegel-Cooper Co. has become a leading case throughout
the United States.'6
13167 N. Y. 244, 60 N. E. 597 (1901).14 Two late cases involving liability on contract based on apparent agency,
with department stores as defendants, are Timmins v. F. N. Joslin Co., 22 N. E.(2d) 76 (Mass. 1939), and Gottlieb Bros. v. Culbertson's, 152 Wash. 205,
277 Pac. 447 (1929). In the former, plaintiff sued on a breach of implied
warranty, having suffered injuries from splinters in bread she had purchased in
the grocery department of defendant's store. The court estopped defendant
from showing that the grocery section of the store was owned by an independent
contractor, since all the elements of ostensible agency were present. In the
latter case, the defendant was held liable on an order contract for the delivery
of furs, entered ifito by his lessee. Here, again, liability was based on an
estoppel. See Note (1939) 123 A. L. R. 594 for a discussion of other cases on
the topic.
15 167 N. Y. 244, 247, 60 N. E. 597, 598 (1901).
16 In tort cases based on apparent agency with department stores as defen-
dants, the facts coincide almost exactly with those of the Hannon case, except
that the lessee is usually a beauty shop instead of a dentist. Augusta Friedman's
Shop, Inc. v. Yeats, 216 Ala. 434, 113 So. 299 (1927) ; Manning v. Leavitt Co.,
5 A. (2d) 667 (N. H. 1939); Fields v. Evans, 36 Ohio App. 153, 172
N. E. 702 (1929); Christiansen v. Fantle Bros., Inc., 56 S. D. 350, 228 N. W.
407 (1930) (an analysis of this case may be found in PRASHKER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF PRivrATE CORPORAIONS 479, n.1).
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Necessity of Contractual Relationship
Dicta in Hannon v. Siegel-Cooper Co., unfortunately, seem to
indicate, that tort liability based on ostensible agency depends upon
the existence of a contractual relationship between the plaintiff and
the apparent principal. The dictum declares :17 "It may very well be
that where the duty, the violation of which constitutes the tort sued
for, springs from no contract with, nor relation to, the principal, a
party would not be estopped from denying that the wrongdoer was his
agent, even though he had held him out as such. In such a case the
representation of the principal would be no factor in producing the
injury complained of." A recent Appellate Division decision has
served to point out the error in this view. In Santise v. Martins,
Inc.,'8 defendant advertised itself as conducting a shoe department.
Plaintiff, before buying any shoes, was injured through the lessee's
negligence by a nail protruding from a pair of shoes she was trying on.
There was no contractual relationship. The defendant store was
estopped from proving that the lessee was an independent contractor
and was held liable for the lessee's tort. With regard to the fact that
no sale had taken place the court said: 1 9
"The difference [between a contractual and non-contrac-
tual relationship] would be important if the action were based
on a breach of warranty. It is not significant in an action for
negligence. The defendant's duty of reasonable care rose as
soon as it offered the shoes to the public, for it must have
known that patrons would try on the shoes before making a
purchase, and the danger of injury from a protruding nail was
just as great before the purchase as after."
Certainly, there can be no question that the stand taken by the
court in the Santise case is sound law. It is a matter of practical
experience that reliance may be placed on a representation despite a
lack of contractual relationship. The plaintiff was relying on the
representation that the lessee was the defendant's agent even though
she had not as yet purchased any shoes. From defendant's represen-
tations she was given the right to believe that defendant would select
careful servants, and in the event of their negligence would be ready
to recompense her for any damages. Furthermore, it would be absurd
to hold that in the absence of a sale, no duty of care was owed to the
plaintiff. A duty of care need not arise from a contractual relation-
ship. It may exist independently. The plaintiff as an invitee and a
prospective buyer was entitled to be protected against all foreseeable
dangers by the exercise of reasonable care. It follows, therefore, that
the necessity of contractual relationship, which is set down in the dicta
1 167 N. Y. 244, 246, 60 N. E. 597, 598 (1901).
'1 258 App. Div. 665, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 742 (2d Dept. 1940).
'9 258 App. Div. 665, 666, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 740, 743 (2d Dept. 1940).
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as a condition precedent to the department store's liability, may be
dismissed as a slip of the pen.
Judicial authority may be found for dispensing with the condition
of contractual relationship in Stevens v. Hulse.20 In that case defen-
dant invited plaintiff to visit his farm to see a bear he had caught.
Plaintiff was told it was safe to feed it. While doing so, she was
attacked and clawed about the legs. In a suit brought by plaintiff to
recover for her injuries, defendant was estopped from disclaiming
responsibility on the ground that the bear belonged to his lessee, who
had leased that section of the farm where the bear was kept. The
court held that plaintiff "had a right to rely on the fact that defendant
seemed to be in charge of the premises owned by him and of the
bear". 21 This case isfarther away from the contractual relationship
idea than the Santise case. In the latter, the intent to enter into a
contract with the apparent principal was present. In the Stevens case
it was lacking entirely.22
A concise test may be formulated for establishing the liability of
the department store which may be expressed by two interrogations:
(1) Was there anv apparent agency upon which the plaintiff relied?
(2) Was there a breach of a legal duty owed to the plaintiff? If the
answers to both of these questions are in the affirmative, then the
defendant store should be liable for any damages suffered. This is a
more realistic approach than the arbitrary denial of liability where the
contractual relationship is absent.
Defenses
The plaintiff is still a long way from obtaining judgment by prov-
ing an ostensible agency. Even as early as the Hannon case, ce-tain
defenses were raised after the agency was conceded. There, illegality,
under an ordinance prohibiting the practice of dentistry without hav-
ing registered and procured a license, and the ultra vires nature of the
dental practice, were urged. The court held both defenses to be
inadequate, and relied on the rule of Bissell v. Mich. Southern R. R.23
that a corporation is liable for the torts of its servants while engaging
in activities beyond its corporate powers.2 4
20 263 N. Y. 421, -189 N. E. 478 (1934).
21263 N. Y. 421, 423, 189 N. E. 478, 479 (1934).
22 Gettlar v. Rubenstein, 71 Misc. 41, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 943 (1939) is in
accord with the Stevens case. Defendant represented its summer camp as hav-
ing horseback riding among its entertainment features. Plaintiff, while riding,
was injured through the riding instructor's negligence. The court estopped the
defendant from disproving the agency and declared the plaintiff could "recover
whether she was an invitee or a mere gratuitous licensee".
2322 N. Y. 258 (1860).
24 Sullivan v. Arkansas Val. Bank, 176 Ark. 278, 2 S. W. (2d) 1096
(1928) ; New York, L. E. & W. Ry. v. Haring, 47 N. J. L. 137 (1885) ; DeGroff
v. American Linen Thread Co., 21 N. Y. 124 (1860) ; Buffet v. Troy & B. R. R.,
40 N. Y. 168 (1869); Southwestern Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Long, 182 S. W. 421
(Tex. Civ. App. 1916); PRASHYMR, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAWS OF
[ VOL. 15
NOTES AND COMMENT
In Maloney Tank Mfg. Co. v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp.,25
defendant was engaged in dismantling oil tanks for the plaintiff. One
of the apparent agents of the defendant, while working, lit a cigarette
and threw the match on the oil-soaked ground. The resulting fire
destroyed all the tanks. The defendant was forced to admit an osten-
sible agency but denied liability on the ground that the damaging acts
were committed outside the scope of the agency.26 The court over-
ruled this contention and held that the smoking was within the bounds
of the agency. In Augusta Pried-maes Shop, Inc. v. Yeats,27 a
department store case, a similar conclusion was reached with regard
to the same defense.
In proving the specific tort complained of, the plaintiff must again
run the gamut of defenses. Here the range is wider, since any one of
the essential elements of the tort may be attacked.28 The more recent
cases employ this line of defense to a greater degree than the older,
where only apparent agency was challenged. So in the Santise case,
defendant contended no duty was owed to the plaintiff to inspect the
shoes exhibited for sale; held, there was a duty, for the defect in the
shoes was not latent, but discoverable on reasonable inspection.2 9 In
the same case contributory negligence of the plaintiff was pleaded.
This, too, was overruled. In Manning v. Leavitt Co.,80 defendant
store requested the court to find the plaintiff guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. This was refused. Only the scarcity
of late cases involving department stores as apparent principals pre-
vents a greater variety of illustrations.
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1937) 387 et seq.; FLETCHER, 10 CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Rev. ed. 1931) §4902; Note (1917A) L. R. A.
749.
25 49 F. (2d) 146 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931).
26 See note 2, supra.
27 216 Ala. 434, 113 So. 299 (1927).
28 Sometimes the plaintiff has a choice of remedy as in Timmins v. F. N.
Joslin Co., 22 N. E. (2d)" 76 (Mass. 1939), where the theory of the action
was breach of warranty. In such cases, privity of contract must be present to
hold the defendant. Chysky v. Drake, 235 N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 576 (1923);
Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe Co., 276 N. Y. 172, 11 N. E. (2d) 718 (1937);
WHITNEY, SALES (2d ed. 1934) § 175.
29 The court distinguished the immediate case from Bruckel v. Milhaus
Son, 116 App. Div. 832, 102 N. Y. Supp. 395 (2d Dept. 1907), where the cause
of injury was the explosion of a bottle charged with gas, and Liedeker v. Sears,
Roebuck and Co., Inc., 249 App. Div. 835, 292 N. Y. Supp. 541 (2d Dept.
1937), aff'd, 274 N. Y. 631, 10 N. E. (2d) 586 (1937), where a folding beach
chair collapsed under plaintiff in defendant's store. Only expert examination
and mechanical test would have revealed the defects in those instances. The
decision relied on in the Santise case was Garvey v. Namm, 136 App. Div. 815,
121 N. Y. Supp. 442 (2d Dept. 1910), where a protruding needle in a new
wrapper bought from the defendant; caused the injury. This defect could have
been corrected by ordinary inspection. Note (1937) 111 A. L. R. 1239.
so 5 A. (2d) 667 (N. H. 1939).
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- Conclusion
Professor Mechem in his treatise on the law of agency recognized
the application of apparent agency to all cases, whether founded in
tort or contract. He observes that "Reliance upon the appearances,
however, does not ordinarily induce the assault, slander, trespass, or
negligent injury, and the cases must be very rare, if any, in which it
could be an element". 31  With this the writer is inclined to agree. A
diligent search of the case books has failed to reveal any other cases
or torts but those founded on the theory of negligence.3 2 However,
the author is confident that, in the future, actions will arise holding
apparent principals liable on other torts as well. They will fill in the
last gaps in the apparent agency-tort liability scheme.
ARTHUR BENNETT.
VALIDITY OF CONTRACT BASED UPON BREACH OF PRIOR EXISTING
CONTRACT
A contract represents the legal obligations of all parties thereto
and defines their legal rights." Any interference with the legal rights
is remediable at law or in equity.2  And the law goes further. It
protects the contracting parties against interference by third parties
not in privity with the contract.3 This protection is of comparatively
modern origin although it sprang from the early master and servant
relationship,4 spread to specialty contracts of a personal nature 5 and,
at present, is applied to all types of contracts.6 The courts have defi-
nitely classified interference with and procurance of a breach of con-
31 1 MEcHEm, AGENCY § 724.
32 (1931) 29 MICH. L. REv. 640.
1 WHITNEY, LAW OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1937) § 1.
2 Id. §12.
3 Blumenthal v. United States, 30 F. (2d) 247 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929), cert.
denied, 279 U. S. 847, 49 Sup. Ct. 345 (1929) ; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555
(1871); Union Car Advertising Co. v. Collier, 263 N. Y. 386, 189 N. E. 463
(1934); Fradus Contracting Co. v. Taylor, 201 App. Div. 298, 194 N. Y. Supp.
386 (1st Dept. 1922) ; Axelrod v. 77 Park Ave. Corp., 225 App. Div. 557, 234
N. Y. Supp. 27 (1st Dept. 1929).
4 Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract (1923) 36 HARv. L. REv. 663, 665.
5 Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & B1. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853); Bowen v.
Hall, 6 Q. B. D. 333 (1881).
6 Employing Printers Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, 50 S. E. 353
(1905) ; Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608, 52 N. E. 924 (1898) ; Beekman v.
Marsters, 195 Mass. 205, 80 N. E. 817 (1907) ; Lamb v. Cheney, 227 N. Y. 418,
125 N. E. 817 (1920) ; Temperton v. Russell (1893) 1 Q. B. 715; Note (1923)
36 HARv. L. REv. 663, 671.
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